



Annual Audit Compliance Report Form

Environmental Protection Act 1986, Part V

Section A – Licence Details			
Licence number:	L4474/1976/14	Licence file number:	
Licence holder:	Fremantle Port Authority		
Trading as:	Fremantle Ports		
ACN:	78 178 229 472		
Registered address:	1 Cliff Street Fremantle		
Reporting period:	01/08/2019 to 31/07/2020		

Section B – Statement of Compliance with Licence Conditions
Did you comply with all of your licence conditions during the reporting period? (please tick the appropriate box)
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes – please complete: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• section C;• section D if required; and• sign the declaration in Section F.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No – please complete: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• section C;• section D if required;• section E; and• sign the declaration at Section F.

Section C – Statement of Actual Production	
Provide the actual production quantity for this reporting period. Supporting documentation is to be attached.	
Prescribed Premises Category	Actual Production Quantity
Category 58 & 58A	2,178,423 tonnes

Section D – Statement of Actual Part 2 Waste Discharge Quantity	
Provide the actual Part 2 waste discharge quantity for this reporting period. Supporting documentation is to be attached.	
Prescribed Premises Category	Actual Part 2 Waste Discharge Quantity
N/A	N/A



Section E – Details of Non-Compliance with Licence Condition			
Please use a separate page for each condition with which the licence holder was non-compliant at a time during the reporting period.			
Condition no:	6	Date(s) of non-compliance:	13/02/2020
Details of non-compliance:			
On 13 February 2020, whilst common user berth operator Qube were unloading sulfur via the Siwertell sulfur overflowed CV01 conveyor's containment system and Transfer Tower 1 (T1) and entered the marine environment.			
What was the actual (or suspected) environmental impact of the non-compliance?			
NOTE – please attach maps or diagrams to provide insight into the precise location of where the non-compliance took place.			
Based on sulfur residue observed on the uncontained grid mesh walkway underneath T1 and to the east of CV01 it was estimated that approximately 10kg of sulfur escaped containment at T1 and 10kg of sulfur escaped containment at CV01, therefore 20kg in total had entered the marine environment. Fremantle Ports does not believe that this incident resulted in environmental harm or pollution.			
Cause (or suspected cause) of non-compliance:			
The sulfur being unloaded from the vessel was known to contain a higher than average moisture content of 3.69% and additional operational controls were in place including undertaking hourly inspections of T1 and CV01 by the Belt-Watchman and the Shift Supervisor to adjust discharge rate accordingly based on the moisture content of the cargo within the hatch and being discharged. A review of the Siwertell's operating rate revealed that during the 15 minutes prior to the incident occurring, the Siwertell was being operated on occasion at a rate higher than the agreed operating rate of 1100 tonnes/hour including exceeding 1100 tonnes/hour on fourteen occasions and exceeding 1400 tonnes/hour on five occasions. The high moisture content of the cargo combined with the exceedance of the maximum operational rate is likely to be the cause of sulfur entering the marine environment.			
Action taken to mitigate any adverse effects of non-compliance and prevent recurrence of the non-compliance:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Engineering designs and scopes of work have been developed for the physical spill containment on CV01 (deflector plates) and a moisture sensor in the Siwertell with both improvements planned to be installed by 30 June 2021. - Where sulfur moisture content is $\geq 3\%$ a reduced Siwertell operational rate is agreed by Fremantle Ports and the Berth Operator at the pre-vessel meeting and this rate is pre-programmed in the Siwertell and if exceeded the operator will see a warning message and a flashing light. - Where sulfur moisture content is $\geq 3\%$ the Berth Operator employs two Belt-Watchmen to continuously inspect T1 and CV01. - CCTV cameras have been installed at KBJ that oversee sulfur import operations. - The T1 trapdoor is locked closed during sulfur import operations to ensure it is not left open or ajar. - Fremantle Ports will continue to monitor sulfur import operational rates until February 2021 to define the maximum Siwertell operating rates for sulfur moisture contents $\geq 3\%$. 			
Was this non-compliance previously reported to DWER?			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes, and			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reported to DWER verbally		Date: 13/02/2020	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reported to DWER in writing		Date: 05/03/2020	

Section E – Details of Non-Compliance with Licence Condition			
Please use a separate page for each condition with which the licence holder was non-compliant at a time during the reporting period.			
Condition no:	6	Date(s) of non-compliance:	29/02/2020
Details of non-compliance:			
On 29 February 2020, whilst common user Berth operator Qube were unloading sulfur via the Siwertell sulfur overflowed CV01 conveyor's containment system and entered the marine environment.			
What was the actual (or suspected) environmental impact of the non-compliance?			
NOTE – please attach maps or diagrams to provide insight into the precise location of where the non-compliance took place.			
Based on the sulfur residue observed on the uncontained grid mesh walkway to the east of CV01, it is estimated that approximately 50kg of sulfur entered the marine environment. Fremantle Ports does not believe that this incident resulted in environmental harm or pollution.			
Cause (or suspected cause) of non-compliance:			
Although not directly related to this incident, the sulfur being unloaded from the vessel was known to contain a higher than average moisture content of 3.69%. Following the sulfur spillage incident that occurred on 13 February 2020 further operational controls were implemented, including a reduced Siwertell operating rate of 500t/hr and additional Belt-Watchman (three Qube personnel) to be positioned continuously at the Siwertell chute, CV01 conveyor and Transfer Tower 1 (T1). The CV01 conveyor was stopped on 29 February 2020 by the T1 Belt-Watchman who observed minor spillage from CV01 and contained to T1. Following the near miss, the Qube Shift Supervisor inspected the vessel's hatch they were unloading from and observed the product remaining in the hatch was too wet to continue unloading from. The Qube Shift Supervisor directed the Siwertell Operator to move the Siwertell north to a drier hatch. Once the Siwertell was in place the conveyor system was restarted. On start-up of the system the Siwertell chute Belt-Watchman observed spillage of product from CV01 coming from the southern side of the chute and contacted Qube's Shift Supervisor rather than pulling the lanyard and stopping CV01 conveyor. Following inspection of the incident, the Qube Shift Supervisor identified that sulfur that was located on CV01 conveyor on the southern side of the Siwertell chute had pushed up against the Siwertell chute's structure as it travelled north on the CV01 conveyor causing sulfur to overflow CV01 conveyor and enter the marine environment..			
Action taken to mitigate any adverse effects of non-compliance and prevent recurrence of the non-compliance:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The engineering design and a scope of work have been developed to improve the Siwertell chute design with improvements planned to be installed by 30 June 2021. As previously reported and of material to this incident, the engineering design and scope of work have been developed for the physical spill containment on CV01 (deflector plates) and is planned to be installed by 30 June 2021. - Qube and Fremantle Ports have updated their Siwertell operational procedures to ensure a) the Berth Operator inspects the CV01 conveyor and belt prior to re-starting conveyors to ensure there is no remaining product or other hazard in the way of the Siwertell chute; b) the Siwertell chute is not travelled over product present on CV01 conveyor; and c) all personnel immediately activate emergency stops when a potential or actual product spillage is observed. - Qube has developed a procedure and training package for the Belt-Watchman role to ensure the responsibilities are documented and understood by personnel undertaking this role. 			
Was this non-compliance previously reported to DWER?			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes, and			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reported to DWER verbally		Date: 01/03/2020	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reported to DWER in writing		Date: 20/03/2020	

Section E – Details of Non-Compliance with Licence Condition			
Please use a separate page for each condition with which the licence holder was non-compliant at a time during the reporting period.			
Condition no:	6	Date(s) of non-compliance:	28/06/2020
Details of non-compliance:			
Between 0832hrs and 1255hrs on 28 June 2020, whilst common user Berth Operator Qube were unloading sulfur via Siwertell sulfur overflowed CV01 conveyor's containment system on three separate occasions and entered the marine environment.			
What was the actual (or suspected) environmental impact of the non-compliance?			
NOTE – please attach maps or diagrams to provide insight into the precise location of where the non-compliance took place.			
Based on the sulfur residue observed on the uncontained grid mesh walkway on the eastern side of CV01 conveyor, it is estimated that approximately 20kg of sulfur (in total) overflowed the CV01 import conveyor's containment system and entered the marine environment. Fremantle Ports does not believe that this incident resulted in environmental harm or pollution.			
Cause (or suspected cause) of non-compliance:			
The incident investigation revealed that a high rainfall event (35.6mm) experienced from 26-28 June 2020 resulted in certain hatches of the vessel (those being discharged from during the high rainfall event) becoming inundated with water and increasing the cargo moisture content. The sulfur being unloaded from the vessel was recorded at the loading port to contain a low moisture content of 1.93% therefore additional operational controls for higher than average moisture content (including a reduced operating rate and belt watchman) were not implemented. The maximum operational rate of the Siwertell was set at 1200 tonnes/hour, however the increased cargo moisture content associated with the high rainfall event meant that the operational rate of the Siwertell on Sunday 28 June 2020 was too high and resulted in spillage from CV01 Conveyor. The investigation also revealed that due to inadequate inspections by Qube's Shift Supervisor the initial spill event to the marine environment (0832 hrs) was not detected and if found may have prevented the additional two spills from occurring. Evidence of spillage from CV01 into the marine environment was identified by Fremantle Ports' Environmental Manager and Environmental Advisor on Monday 29 June 2020.			
Action taken to mitigate any adverse effects of non-compliance and prevent recurrence of the non-compliance:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As previously reported and of material to this incident, engineering designs and scopes of work have been developed for the physical spill containment on CV01 (deflector plates), moisture sensor to be installed in the Siwertell and the improved Siwertell chute design and improvements are planned to be installed by 30 June 2021. - For all future sulfur operations, the maximum Siwertell operating rate has been reduced from 1200 tonnes/hour to 1000 tonnes/hour to reduce the likelihood of spillage and will be reassessed following the implementation of the noted engineering controls. - Qube have updated their operational procedures to ensure an adequate response to high rainfall events during the management of sulfur discharge operations and to require immediate communication to Fremantle Ports operational and environment teams when spillage occurs within containment. 			
Was this non-compliance previously reported to DWER?			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes, and			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reported to DWER verbally		Date: 29/06/2020	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reported to DWER in writing		Date: 17/07/2020	

Section F – Declaration

I/We declare that the information in this Annual Audit Compliance Report is true and correct and is not false or misleading in a material particular¹. I/We consent to the Annual Audit Compliance Report being published on the Department of Water and Environmental Regulation's (DWER) website.

Signature ² :		Signature:	
Name: (printed)		Name: (printed)	
Position:	<i>C.E.O.</i>	Position:	
Date:	<i>8. Sept 2020</i>	Date:	
Seal (if signing under seal):			

¹ It is an offence under section 112 of the *Environmental Protection Act 1986* for a person to give information on this form that to their knowledge is false or misleading in a material particular.

² AACRs can only be signed by the licence holder or an authorised person with the legal authority to sign on behalf of the licence holder.